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Abstract. This article regards the field of neuroscience and indicates on the proper 
or erroneous functioning of the human brain. Intellectual virtues, especially practical 
wisdom (prudence/ prudentia) play a significant role in capturing the truth and imple-
menting it in life. The agile formation of the cognitive function of man encompasses 
both his reason as well as the sensual judgment of utility with all the bodily backup 
(vis cogitativa). The brain possesses great plasticity in the production of neuronal con-
nections. Habit as a permanent wont utilizes the reactions being developed to the 
construction of often inappropriate mechanisms, that in turn are not easy or completely 
impossible to eliminate. When practical reason is introduced into a false ethos, the brain 
responds by forming “ruts” of neuronal connections which seem difficult to consider as 
something appropriate. The reparation of the existing situation and the removal of the 
wrong habit require relevant virtues so as to unblock the psychological resistance that 
is deeply rooted within the physiological neuronal substrate. The learning about the 
virtues of St. Thomas Aquinas is the best warranty not only for theoretical explanations, 
but also for the practical application of virtues in dealing with the arised situation. Only 
well-formed virtues give the opportunity to correct the false instinctive cognition and 
liberate from erroneous actions.
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Modern neurological brain research has located an organ which is respon-
sible for taking moral decisions. Walter Glannon, a professor of neuroethics 
at the University of Calgary, Canada defines it as ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC). The ethics of neurobiology goes as far as to claim that 
external, environmental and social factors dynamically contribute to the 
creation and transmission of neuronal connections in the brain, which are 
responsible for moral conduct of man.
Thus, shall we abandon the idea of free will and confine in neurons? 
Does being free equal the wish to have all physical and chemical powers on 
our side, serving our nervous and somatic systems? Is the conviction that we 
make decisions ourselves only an illusion? Contemporary neurobiologists, 
e.g. Michael S. Gazzaniga1, Antonio Damasio2, Joseph E. LeDoux3 or John 
Terrence Cacioppo4 claim that the basis of human behaviour is rooted in 
neuronal interactions and that human convictions, thoughts and desires 
evolve on behalf of brain activity. At the same time they exert influence on 
our decisions regarding to what kind of actions we take. They search for 
both new terms and a new understanding of personal responsibility in this 
new world of basic physiological, neuronal as well as neurosocial activities 
of the brain. Thus, a question arises concerning the uniqueness of man 
which actually is the main determinant of human “self”, especially if we 
are so strongly defined by our habits determined by neuronal connections 
in our brain (Gazzaniga 2013, 14–42). Another question focuses on the 
sufficient reasons of human life and whether the deterioration in quality 
1 Michael S. Cassaniga, the head of the new SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara and the president of the Institute of Cognitive 
Neuroscience.
2 Antonio Damasio, a Portuguese professor of behavioral neurology at the University of 
Southern California where he is head of the Brain and Creativity Institute.
3 Joseph E. LeDoux, an American neuroscientist whose research is primarily focused on the 
biological underpinnings of emotion and memory, especially brain mechanisms related 
to fear and anxiety. He is a professor of science at New York University and director of the 
Emotional Brain Institute.
4 John Terrence Cacioppo co-founded the field of social neuroscience and is a professor 
at the University of Chicago and Director of the Chicago Center for Cognitive and Social 
Neuroscience.
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of life which causes damage to human consciousness is enough to decide 
about life termination (Glannon 2011, 165–173).
Undoubtedly, the human brain has its own plasticity and neuronal 
connections that are in fact responsible for the reactions which assess 
the usefulness of the subject known by senses. Thomas Aquinas was also 
convinced of this but nonetheless believed that although the brain is located 
in the skull it is not equivalent to the mind even though it is a necessary 
basis of it. The brain is placed within the person who experiences various 
influences, that are incompatible or consistent with nature. In this situation, 
man does not lose his human dignity.
It appears that the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on virtues may, to 
a certain extent, answer the question concerning disorders which originate 
from the appetitive and sense powers that prevent or impede the creation of 
moral faculty. Frequently, bodily injuries cannot be eliminated, nevertheless 
psychological obstacles which block moral virtues on the emotional level 
can be unblocked although they may be a proverbial “thorn in the flesh” 
which enslaves man throughout his entire life.
Thomas Aquinas was neither a physician nor a psychiatrist but against 
the background of his teaching on virtues, especially the virtue of temper-
ance and fortitude (those which interact with appetitus irascibilis – irascible 
appetite and appetitus concupiscibilis – concupiscible appetite) he presents 
a certain mechanism of their formation or resistance in their shaping 
which may serve as a foundation for a possible discussion on modern 
neurobiology. A natural environment for the development of those virtues 
is the environment of cognitive as well as appetitive powers, the human 
free will and human emotions. For Thomas, man is a psycho-somatic unity 
and thus human moral abilities are formulated on a psycho-physical and 
cognitive-appetitive reaction where internal senses of cognitive powers 
(the sense which accumulates the sensations of external senses, memory, 
imagination and judgment about utility using senses, vis cogitativa in 
a man) as well as the mental sphere of reason and will, irascible passions 
(hope-despair; courage-fear, anger) and concupiscible passions (love-hate, 
desire-avoidance, joy-sorrow) play an important role. It can be clearly stated 
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that according to Aquinas, the inception of moral virtues also depends on 
the physiological characteristics of the individual.
In his exhortation Evangelii Gaudium Pope Francis, by relying on Thomas’ 
teaching on virtues mentions the erroneous process of intimistic growth 
and the “art of accompaniment” of suffering people.
In no 171, Pope Francis writes that the main issue in communication 
with another person is the openness of heart which makes closeness possible 
because without it genuine spiritual encounter does not exist. Listening 
helps us to find the right gesture and word which shows that we are more 
than simply bystanders. Only through such respectful and compassionate 
listening we can enter the paths of true growth and awaken a yearning for 
the Christian ideal: the desire to fully respond to God’s love and to bring to 
fruition what he has sown in our lives. But this always demands the patience 
of one who knows very well what Saint Thomas Aquinas was teaching: ‘that 
a person can have both grace and charity, but yet falter in the exercise of 
virtues because of persistent «contrary inclinations»’ (S. Th., I–II, q. 65, a. 3, 
ad 2: propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias). In other words, even though 
forms of conditioning may hinder the operations of those virtuous habits 
the organic unity of virtues always and necessarily exists in habitu. Hence 
the need for “a pedagogy which will introduce people step by step to the 
full appropriation of the mystery” (John Paul II 1999, 20). In order to reach 
a level of maturity where individuals can make truly free and responsible 
decisions time and patience is indispensible”. At the end of this paragraph on 
the process of growth and the art of accompaniment Pope Francis adds: “This 
is clearly distinct from every kind of intrusive (intimistic) accompaniment 
or isolated self-realization” (Francis 2013, 173).
Pope Francis suggests the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on virtues for 
accompanying people in their numerous afflictions, distinguishing it from 
an intrusive (intimistic) accompaniment, which according to him is wrong. 
It is possible that we will learn more on this issue during the synod which 
will take place in 2017 and will be devoted to personal accompaniment in 
processes of growth. 
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Thomas Aquinas was convinced that certain disorders may occur in 
grasping practical truth and instead of moral faculty, undesired habits might 
appear. Thus, the understanding of the process of habituation gives the 
opportunity to overcome and uproot undesired behaviour (Roszak 2014, 110).
Some habits might be permanently inscribed in us creating a certain 
fixed “path” in our mental space, whereas in the brain fixed neuronal con-
nections might become simple habits absolutely contrary to the intentions 
of virtue. It is easy to identify such a habit with our own habitus, a virtue 
as a moral faculty. However, we are dealing here with an intimistic process 
which Pope Francis mentions. The term intimism5 derives from a French 
word journal intime which might be referred to as an “intimate journal”. 
Hence, in literature we speak of intimism. In English, journal intime denotes 
a diary and therefore there are two parallel terms, namely intimistics and 
diaristics. Some theologians and spiritual directors suggest that writing 
a journal as a spiritual training encourages self-discipline and develops 
moral awareness. This practice originated from a conviction that writing 
in a journal daily awakens a sensitivity of the Christian’s conscience, serves 
the development of self-control, and good examination of conscience and 
confession. In the context of neuronal record intimistics appears to be 
a specific singular record in the brain and in using Aquinas’ language the 
sensitive power of apprehension. It is no longer an external description 
of personal and private life registered in the form of a journal, notes or 
notebooks but an internal result of actions and personal decisions as well 
as external influences creating fixed neuronal connections by encompassing 
many regions of the brain. The ones that are mainly located in the brain 
areas are responsible for sense reactions and assess the usefulness of the 
known subject qualifying it as pleasant or unpleasant. Habitual disorders 
most often lead to distortions of sensory movements which may impede the 
growth of a virtue. Senses on the other hand, instead of supporting a moral 
disposition become an blocking obstacle (Giertych 2015, 56–61).
5 Intimism describes something related to intimacy, privacy, especially the depiction of 
quiet domestic scenes in literature or art.
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According to Thomas, when reason grasps directly practical truth, it 
does not act on a purely rational logic but is linked with the vis aestimativa 
(a form of judging whether some particular thing when perceived is beneficial 
or not – estimative power), in man called the vis cogitativa (the cogitative 
power) or ratio particularis (particular reason). This estimative power is based 
on senses and possesses its own physiological place in the brain. It might 
appear that it is a spiritual power of reason as it instinctively correlates 
reasons relying on the sensus communis whereas together with memory 
(memoria) and imagination (imaginatio), namely the remaining internal 
senses,6 identifies the meaning of the thing that is known through the 
senses. Depending on the quality of the vis aestimativa and its agreement 
with the fundamental purpose of nature it encourages the formation of 
a virtue or of a simple habit. The neural habit in the brain may become 
irreducible practical knowledge, which Thomas calls industria. The fully 
prudent perception of our reason which cooperates with the human will 
and is supported by the sphere of human emotions becomes reduced to 
particular reason. The role of the human intellect with its intellectual 
knowledge inscribed in the sphere of freedom (the will) which can testify 
of the dignity of virtue becomes somehow “slimmed down” and reduced to 
the level of “natural prudence”. We are here dealing with a habit and not 
a virtue where a person is “skillful” and possesses “mental acuity” through 
which he might be praised, even if he is not morally good. Only virtue and 
not the habit brings out moral goodness in man. “Slimmed down” prudence 
may become a leading norm of conduct and that type of prudence, although 
6 It must be remembered that according to Thomas, mental cognition is not given in the 
form of notions, judgments or inborn reasoning. Man must work it out and discover what 
constitutes the essence of mental understanding. This is an Aristotelian orientation 
where cognition depends on senses. The outer senses are touch (tactus), taste (gustus), 
smell (olfactus), hearing (auditus) and sight (visus), whereas the inner senses are common 
sense (sensus propprius/communis), passive and active memory (memoria passiva et activa), 
imagination, (imaginatio), phantasy (phantasia), sensitive power of estimation, which in 
man due to intellectual knowledge and the influence on senses is called vis cogitativa and 
particular reason (ratio particularis). The powers of the sensitive appetite are passions 
(passiones) of the irascible (irascibilitas) and concupiscible (concupiscibilitas) sphere.
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it is difficult to apply this term here, is presented in Aquinas’ reflections in 
his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. 
In Thomas’ thought we can encounter a certain area of “mental acuity” 
(”diligence”) called industria which has to do with what is practical, exper-
imental, physiological and psychological, namely what is possible to be 
known directly and experimentally. It may acquire the shape of a “slimmed 
down prudence”, and appears as inner “shrewdness”, just as a stream of 
water finds the most convenient and pleasant current flow. 
In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Thomas says: “there 
exists a certain potency (potentia), namely an operative principle (opera-
tivum principium), called deinotes, a certain form of agility or acuity (quasi 
ingeniositatem quamdam sive industria), that possesses the quality thanks 
to which man may do acts that are subordinated to a chosen intention 
(per eam homo possit operari ea quae ordinantur ad intentionem quam homo 
praesupposuit) whether it will be good or bad, so that he can achieve the aim 
through the things he does. If the intention is good, deinotes is praiseworthy 
but if it is bad, it is called shrewdness vocatur astutia which has a negative 
connotation, in the same way as prudence has a positive connotation. 
As deinotes is common for both of them, thus we call people that are both 
prudent and shrewd (tam prudentes quam astutos) deinoi, that is ingenuous 
and diligent (id est ingeniosos sive industrios).
Thomas does not reprove human industria, on the contrary, he demon-
strates that this diligence or mental acuity can be used in a positive way. In 
his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard he observes that it might 
constitute a certain foundation of prudence. 
In Scriptum super Sententiis he writes: “Man has a certain innate inclina-
tion towards a prudent act (inclinatio quaedam naturalis ad actum prudentiae), 
described as a natural virtue (quae virtus naturalis dicitur), called by the 
Philosopher dinotica [deinotes], which may be defined as wise effort (quam 
nos industriam dicere possumus); it can be directed towards the good or bad 
and is therefore not a virtue; a virtue is such a disposition which inclines 
and allows man to fulfill a task in a good and proper manner. Thus, if this 
inclination should lead to its constantly correct judgement, it is necessary 
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to connect it with something that excludes every kind of error (Super Sent., 
lib. 3, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1c).
It is clear that industria is neither prudence, nor a virtue of practical 
wisdom as it is not anchored in the full dynamism of human rationality nor 
free will where moral virtues are “formed”.
It is confirmed in Thomas’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics 
where he says that “prudence is not the ability...” (the words of Aristotle 
from his Ethics 1144a28). He shows this by demonstrating that prudence 
is not fully the same as abovementioned deinotes, although it cannot exist 
without it. However, in the soul such an eye [visus], namely the cognitive 
principle which is deinotes, does not acquire characteristic features typical 
for prudence without the usage of a moral virtue, which always inclines 
towards the good.
The industria cooperates in a natural way with man who is submerged 
in virtue, that is, has the principles of good inscribed in him in order to 
focus on the good. A good and virtuous man is given the possibility of doing 
things with an impulse to progress further with joy towards the good and 
determined aim. A man who relies on habits uses his skilfulness and mental 
acuity without orientation towards an adequate aim. Instead of finis there 
is terminus. This becomes a reason for dishonesty even towards oneself 
because it contradicts further cognition in facing the ultimate goal. In such 
a case, man uses his natural faculties, like sharpened ingenuity, sensitivity 
to time, colours, quick understanding of the sequences of events, mental 
acuity in technical solutions, etc not for the ultimate good but for an empty 
glory (inanis gloria) of the present moment.
Thomas knew well that errors in vis cogitativa that may occur through 
habits of sense reactions inscribed in the plasticity of bodily reactions 
(today we may say inscribed in the localized organ responsible for making 
moral decisions which W. Glannon defines as ventromedial prefrontal cortex ) 
contradict a full rational judgment. In the Summa I–II, q.31, a.7 Thomas asks 
about unnatural pleasures (delectatio innaturalia), such as some improper 
sexual acts but also in eating soil, coals or finding pleasure in cannibalism. 
To this he answers that it happens due to reason (quantum ad rationem) or 
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due to actions of the body (quantum ad corporalis conservationem). Such 
corruption sometimes originates directly from the body where illness is the 
reason for it and therefore what seemed to be sweet turns out to be bitter 
and vice versa. Or it may originate from the soul as a result of not being 
in unity with what is part of the body: propter malam complexionem. Such 
an error creates on a bad habit its own new quasi-habitus. An old habit, 
deeply rooted in the psyche may appear as “connatural” with the human 
being as its purpose although in reality it is contrary to it. The correction 
of such an error is almost impossible if vis cogitativa together with practical 
reason incorrectly understand the subject of pleasure and when the entire 
collection of human emotions creates a safety barrier of this habitual error. 
A wrong disposition of unity in habits when referring to a mutual action 
of body and soul on the level of brain functioning can turn a permanent 
principle of moral conduct into an error of sense habit. Thomas clearly 
states that “in man it is of importance to consider both reason as well as 
natural temperament of the body” (S. Th., I–II, q. 46, a. 5, ad 1). Because 
of his nature man possesses a certain balance of the body and due to it no 
powers of the soul have an excessive domination over others. It is different 
with animals, because they are not free but determined and do not act in 
accordance with virtues only according to their habits. 
Only virtue as a moral faculty indicates that the unity of soul and body 
is balanced (complexio). It also signifies that only virtue has this good 
disposition of unity between body and soul from which qualitative acts 
originate, corresponding to human nature. Virtue is well-disposed to res 
which is the human nature, consisting of both soul and body. Thus, virtue 
as a quality possesses a concrete and proper category of references to the 
soul and body, called by Aristotle “position” situs. A virtuous man acts in 
accordance with adequate dynamism of reason, will, senses and his own 
body. Virtue appears when there is a unity of action. Moral virtue acts in 
a similar way to nature in the duality of soul and body harmonizing their 
mutual connectivity, subjecting it to the assessment of the intellect, in ac-
cordance with the decision of will (cum assensione cogitare). The habituation 
for a virtue and a habit is different. 
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Virtue is a certain natural disposition (ex quadam naturali dispositione), 
that is different when the habituation to act originates from something 
“only acquired by habituation” (per consuetudinem acquisita) (S. Th., II–II, 
q. 141, a 1).
In the Summa Theologiae, I–II, q, 56, a. 5 Thomas clearly states that 
“if there are any powers in the sensory cognitive faculties, they cannot 
be named virtues, for virtue is a perfect habit, through which only good is 
done and therefore only mental power which performs the good act can 
be its subject. Thus getting to know the truth does not take place in the 
sensory cognitive faculties, for such powers prepare the way only for 
intellective knowledge. And therefore a virtue may be found in the mind 
or in reason but not in sensory powers. Thus, vis cogitativa cannot create 
virtue by itself although it may seem to be quasi-habitus (Giertych 2015, 57).
According to Aquinas moral faculty is a certain “condensed experience” 
which allows to take the right decision in accordance with the inner dyna-
mism of reason and will. Unfortunately, it is often confused with habit which 
is no more than a certain unconscious action. Moral faculty always retains 
the freshness of action although certain habitual elements can be found 
even here. Some people even talk about the “paradox of non-determining 
habit”. In virtue, “despite a certain learned action, intellect and some element 
of a conscious choice is preserved” (Zalewski 2013, 129). Jacek Woroniecki 
OP in discussing the difference between faculty and habit observes that 
in the formation of habit “the mental factor is reduced to the minimum” 
(Woroniecki 2008, 133), and where this facility is complete, namely in 
a formal virtue, it is rooted in the full dynamism of the intellect. The mental 
factor seems to be the decisive one which is not equated only with the brain 
although it is a necessary basis for human intellectual actions. Reason is 
rooted in the personal nature of man, while virtue supports integration, 
not exclusion (Huzarek 2017, 237–250).
In answering the question to which is more important: the soul or the 
brain, we take the side of both the brain and the soul. Both of them with 
all their powers play an important role in the structure of developing truly 
human virtues (Horvat 2017, 127–153).
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The stance of St. Thomas Aquinas in seeing the danger between the 
formation of the ethics of habits and morality based on the principles of 
neurobiology is very clear. It is the reduction of the mental level to the level 
of senses, where initially there is a weak differentiation between these two 
levels, their rights and their development. The action of reason and will is 
limited to lower levels of cognitive and appetitive acts, to cognitio sensibilis 
and appetitus sensibilis, instead of cognitio intellectualis and appetitus intel-
lectualis. Aquinas does not contradict any of them and does not reduce any 
of these two levels (Woroniecki 1961, 36–42). In analysing the suggestions 
of I. Kant it can be observed that the protection against mechanization and 
the ethics of habit leads to the conviction that the teaching about virtue 
should be limited to the teaching of noble intellectual ideals, without the 
temptation of letting faculties penetrate the soul mainly by reaching the 
levels of sensual desires. It may be said that Kant follows Cartesian spiri-
tualism, without seeing a strict, organic and substantive link between soul 
and body where the entire psychology is limited to one sphere of rationality 
(Damasio 2011, 272–276). It may as well be the other way around where 
reduction will take the form of materialistic and sensitive mechanicism 
e.g. in S. Freud. Habits calm down the movements of drives, keeping them 
within limits, not allowing them to incline to their subject. In this case, 
when the movement of sense is interpreted as negative another sense which 
attempts to “extinguish” the undesired one is instinctively activated. Such 
an action roots itself in neurotic habits which may result in neuroses and 
other disorders of sensitive reactions. Sometimes when bodily injuries no 
longer are to be eliminated, nevertheless psychological barriers of neurotic 
habits on the level of senses that are susceptible to be unblocked, may be 
a proverbial “thorn in the flesh” which enslaves man for his entire life. For 
this reason, Anna A. Terruwe and Conrad W. Baars, Dutch psychiatrists 
with many years of therapeutic practice, successfully apply Thomistic 
speculative psychology (Terruwe 1981). They describe the causes, effects 
and types of treatment of the emotional depravation disorder, which is an 
illness discovered by them (Giertych 2006, 228–260).
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 The solution to the discussed difficulties which appear on the basis 
of the development of a habit or virtue is the ability to recognize and put 
into effect a full facilitation of both cognitive and appetitive functions. The 
thought of Thomas seems to offer a balanced view of the soul and the body 
and at the same time of the soul and the brain. On one hand, the differences 
and competences of both are emphasized while on the other hand, a strict, 
organic and substantial link between those two centres is stressed which 
allows to discover the richness of spiritual, sensitive, sensory and bodily 
functions. As it is impossible to act spiritually without the help of bodily 
organs, it is impossible to build moral virtues without a fully spiritual 
structure (Milcarek 1994, 153–200). It is therefore necessary to reject both 
a radically materialistic approach and a radically spiritualistic thinking. 
By receiving certain habitual functions the virtue shortens the process 
of thinking; however, it is not a habit, in the same way as a habit is not 
a virtue (Głowala, 135–207). Nevertheless, in every virtue we discover two 
principal functions of the spirit: reason and will as well as accompanying 
sensitive-appetitive factors. The potentiality of the entire soul in its spiritual 
and bodily sphere is the most striking feature of moral faculties.
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